Last Updated: 2008-01-08 22:29:12 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 3)
Overview of the January 2008 Microsoft patches and their status.
|#||Affected||Contra Indications||Known Exploits||Microsoft rating||ISC rating(*)|
|MS08-001||Multiple vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP stack lead to arbitrary code execution and denial of service.
|KB 941644||No publicly known exploits||Critical||Critical||Critical|
|MS08-002||Input validation errors in Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) lead to local exploitation and privilege escalation.|
|KB 943485||No publicly known exploits||Important||Important||Important|
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
- We use 4 levels:
- PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
- Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
- Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
- Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
- The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
- The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
- Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
- All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.
Swa Frantzen -- Gorilla Security
Last Updated: 2008-01-08 21:56:56 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 2)
Matt Richard from Verisign's iDefense sent us some information regarding the Master Boot Record (MBR) rookit that's been found in the wild in the past weeks.
The first interesting part is the timeline:
- Aug 1, 2005 - eEye publishes PoC code
- Aug. 3, 2007 - Vbootkit presentation at Black Hat USA
- Oct. 30, 2007 - Original version of MBR rootkit written and tested by attackers
- Dec. 12, 2007 – First known attacks installing MBR code
about 1,800 users infected in four days.
- Dec. 19, 2007 - Second wave of attacks installing MBR code
about 3,000 users infected in four days
- Dec. 22, 2007 – Malware Research Form members discover rootkit in the wild
- Jan. 2, 2008 - GMER research and analysis of MBR Rootkit code
- Jan. 7, 2008 – First anti-virus vendors detect MBR rootkit components
The next big thing is that those distributing this rootkit, also distribute the Torpig banking Trojan.
The rootkit is currently being installed through a set of relatively old, and easy to patch Microsoft vulnerabilities:
- Microsoft JVM ByteVerify (MS03-011)
- Microsoft MDAC (MS06-014) (two versions)
- Microsoft Internet Explorer Vector Markup Language (MS06-055)
- Microsoft XML CoreServices (MS06-071)
But that can change at any moment to something more recent.
The different files involved had rather spurious detection in the anti-virus world.
Swa Frantzen -- Gorilla Security